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Note 
THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT:   
INCENTIVE OR HINDRANCE FOR NEW LITERATURE? 
SARAH E. ZYBERT 
The Copyright Act provides incentives to stimulate the production of artistic 
work for the good of the general public.  These incentives include the exclusive 
right to prepare derivative works, such as a sequel. This Note argues that in 
practice, however, the right to prepare derivative works actually stifles creativity.  
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company and Salinger v. Colting provide 
examples of legal challenges to valuable work from new authors who wrote novels 
based on previously published works. While both novels provided valuable 
commentary and critique to previous works, existing copyright law only protected 
one.  In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit found in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Company that Alice Randall’s novel, The Wind Done Gone, was a parody of Gone 
with the Wind, and therefore constituted fair use.  In contrast, the Second Circuit 
found in 2010 that Fredrik Colting would not succeed with a fair use defense 
because his novel 60 Years Later, Coming Through the Rye was a sequel to J.D. 
Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye with satiric elements, rather than a parody.   
The existing regime fails to meet its intended goal of promoting the useful arts 
for the public because works such as 60 Years Later, Coming Through the Rye are 
prevented from distribution, even when the original author had no intent of 
preparing any derivative works to benefit the public.  This Note proposes two 
suggestions to improve the system.  First, this Note argues that the distinction 
between parody and satire should be eliminated and both forms of commentary 
should be given equal protection.  Second, this Note argues that the intentions of 
the copyright owner should be considered in determining the period of time the 
owner is granted the exclusive right to prepare derivative works and within the 
fair use analysis.   
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THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT:   
INCENTIVE OR HINDRANCE FOR NEW LITERATURE? 
 SARAH E. ZYBERT

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution calls for the promotion of the “Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”1  For copyright law to successfully achieve this goal, it must 
maintain the delicate balance between creating incentives for authors to 
produce new works and giving the public access to these works.  This Note 
examines one of these incentives, the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works, and how it stifles creativity to the detriment of the public.   
In an attempt to balance the goals of copyright law, the Copyright Act 
grants authors several exclusive rights, including the right to prepare 
derivative works.
2
  As a limitation to these rights, the Copyright Act 
recognizes a fair use defense, which “permits courts to avoid rigid 
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”3  This Note examines 
two cases where the copyright owner of an original novel brought an 
infringement action against subsequent writers for attempting to publish 
unauthorized derivative works and where the subsequent authors raised the 
fair use defense.
4
   Examining these two cases shows that fair use does not 
always protect against the stifling of creativity.  This Note proposes two 
independent changes to the current regime that would diminish the 
problems caused by the derivative work rights: first, the elimination of the 
distinction between parodies and satires in the courts’ fair use analysis and 
second, the consideration of the intentions of the copyright owner in 
determining the length of the derivative work right and whether derivatives 
                                                                                                                          
 Fairfield University, summa cum laude, B.A. 2009; University of Connecticut School of Law, 
J.D. Candidate 2013.  I would like to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for providing thoughtful 
feedback throughout the drafting of this Note.  I would also like to thank the Connecticut Law Review 
for their excellent work.  Finally, I would like to thank my parents and Tony da Costa for their constant 
support and encouragement.   
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating the exclusive rights of copyright owners). 
3 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 
1980).  
4 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2010); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (illustrating two similar legal battles about unauthorized 
literary sequels).   
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constitute fair use by the U.S. Copyright Office and the courts.     
Part II provides an overview of the United States copyright system, 
including a discussion of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, 
the period of copyright protection, the goals of the copyright system, and 
tensions within the copyright system.  Part III summarizes the district court 
and court of appeals decisions in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 
and Salinger v. Colting, where the court in each case applied the fair use 
analysis to allegedly infringing derivative works.  Part IV explains why the 
parody/satire dichotomy is problematic and proposes that courts should 
eliminate the distinction when performing a fair use analysis.  Finally, Part 
V suggests that the U.S. Copyright Office and the courts should consider 
the intentions of the copyright owner when determining the length of the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works and when conducting a fair use 
analysis.     
II.  OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT 
A.  Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative Works  
Section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act grants the owner of a copyright 
the right to do and authorize the “reproduc[tion of] the copyrighted work in 
copies” and the “prepar[ation of] derivative works.”5  The right to prepare 
derivative works was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.
6
  American 
copyright law originally only protected against the literal reproduction of a 
work.
7
  United States copyright law “traces its source to British censorship 
laws of the sixteenth century.”8  The Statute of Anne prevented publishers 
from reproducing works without the original author’s consent.9  The 
Statute of Anne strived “to encourage creativity and ensure that the public 
would have free access to information by putting an end to the continued 
use of copyright as a device of censorship.”10  This limited protection 
against reproduction has gradually expanded in United States copyright 
law.  For example, in 1870, Congress gave authors “the right to dramatize 
or translate.”11  A derivative work is now broadly defined as:   
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as 
                                                                                                                          
5 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(2) (2006).   
6 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006)).   
7 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 49 
(2002). 
8 ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006).   
9 See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (granting the author the sole right of printing his 
or her book).    
10 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
11 Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).    
 2013] THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT 1087 
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative 
work”.12 
This definition gives copyright owners extensive control over the potential 
exploitation of their work.  In the context of literature, derivative works 
include sequels.
13
  A sequel recasts, transforms, or adapts a preexisting 
work.
14
  A derivative work right that is overly broad subverts the very 
goals of copyright.   
One argument for the expansion of copyright protection to include the 
right to prepare derivative works is that the prospective profits from these 
works are necessary to incentivize the production of the original.
15
  This 
argument is only viable “where the projected economic gain from the 
original work is less than its production costs, and the additional projected 
gain from the derivative work is large enough to compensate the author for 
the costs of producing both works.”16  Moreover, if the original author 
chooses not to produce or license derivative works, even if it is 
economically beneficial to do so, then clearly the derivative work right is 
not a necessary incentive for the creation of the original work.
17
  This point 
is manifested in J.D. Salinger’s insistence that there should be no 
derivative works of his famous novel The Catcher in the Rye.
18
   
While it is unclear whether the derivative work right is a necessary 
economic incentive for authors, it does give original authors a high level of 
control over the future of the copyrighted work.  The right to control 
potential adaptations of the work may be a crucial incentive for certain 
authors.  For instance, some authors may only write a new book with the 
assurance that the integrity of the work can be maintained with the right to 
                                                                                                                          
12 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  
13 Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
701, 750 (2010) (“Sequels generally are derivative works . . . .”).   
14 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2001) 
(relying on a definition of a sequel as a literary work which continues the narrative of a preceding 
work).   
15 John M. Newman, Note, Holden Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v. Colting, The Promotion-of-
Progress Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime, 96 IOWA L. REV.  737, 745 
(2011).   
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 745–46. 
18 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Salinger has never permitted, and has 
explicitly instructed his lawyers not to allow, adaptations of his works.”).     
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manage all derivatives of the copyrighted material, such as films or 
sequels.   
B.  Length of Protection 
Currently, the copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus 
seventy years.
19
  The period of protection has continued to expand since 
the inception of copyright law.  The Copyright Act of 1909 granted federal 
copyright protection for twenty-eight years, and an additional twenty-eight 
years upon timely renewal.
20
  Under the Copyright Act of 1976,  
[w]orks then in the first term or the renewal term of 
copyright under the 1909 Act had their term of protection 
potentially extended to 75 years.  Works created on or after 
January 1, 1978, or first published thereafter, were to be 
protected for 50 years after the death of the author, and 
corporate works were to be protected for 75 years after 
publication.
21
   
In 1998, Congress followed the lead of European nations and added 
twenty years to the length of copyright protection.
22
  The Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act extended protection for corporate works 
and works protected under the 1909 Act from seventy-five to ninety-five 
years.
23
  It also extended protection for works created after January 1, 1978 
from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years.
24
  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the Supreme Court held that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1988 
did not violate the “limited times” requirement established in the 
Constitution.
25
  Because the length of protection is virtually perpetual, the 
consequences of problems within the system are heightened because they 
continue for so long.   
C.  Fair Use 
Section 107 places some limitations on the exclusive rights of authors 
because others may use the original author’s works if that use constitutes 
“fair use.”26  The fair use defense is designed to protect “purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
                                                                                                                          
19 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).  
20 GORMAN, supra note 8, at 2–3.   
21 Id. at 3.     
22 Id. at 65.   
23 Id. at 5.  
24 Id. 
25 537 U.S. 186, 199–204 (2003).   
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (outlining the fair use defense).   
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for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”27  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that parodies may claim fair use under 
Section 107.
28
 
Fair use analysis considers four factors:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.
29
 
D.  Tensions in Copyright Law 
Congress receives its authority to grant copyright protection from 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.  In order to promote the 
progress of the arts, Congress can grant authors exclusive rights to 
copyrightable subject matter for limited times.
30
  The promotion of 
progress of the arts is challenged by the complexity of balancing the 
incentive necessary for authors and publishers to create and distribute new 
works against the availability of these works to the public.  Tension also 
exists between granting authors exclusive rights to their works and the 
First Amendment’s commitment to freedom of speech.31   
United States courts have recognized the tensions within copyright 
law, and often emphasize the ultimate goals of congressional power and 
the Copyright Act in their opinions.  The Supreme Court stated that the 
ultimate goal of copyright law is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.”32  The means to achieve this goal is to provide 
incentive to authors to create artistic works by granting them a monopoly.  
Specifically, the limited grant of exclusive rights “is intended to motivate 
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special 
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after 
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”33  Congress’s task of 
serving the public good with ultimate access to artistic works requires a 
difficult balance between the interests of authors “in the control and 
exploitation of their [works]” and “society’s competing interest in the free 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id.  
28 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).   
29 17 U.S.C. § 107.   
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of  
speech . . . .”).   
32 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).   
33 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).   
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flow of ideas, information, and commerce.”34 
In its opinion in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., the Eleventh 
Circuit identified three main goals of copyright law: “the promotion of 
learning, the protection of the public domain, and the granting of an 
exclusive right to the author.”35  The court explained that copyright law 
promotes learning by guarding against censorship and by incentivizing 
authors to create new works, which together promote public access to new 
ideas and concepts.
36
  Copyright law protects the public domain because it 
ensures that artistic works enter the public domain after the limited 
exclusive rights expire.
37
  Finally, copyright grants authors these exclusive 
rights “to encourage the creation of original works.”38 
On their face the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are 
inherently in conflict.
39
  While copyright law provides incentive for the 
creation and distribution of creative works, copyright law “also burdens 
speech.  We often copy or build upon another’s words, images, or music to 
convey our own ideas effectively.  We cannot do that if a copyright holder 
withholds permission or insists upon a license fee that is beyond our 
means.”40  The balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright 
Clause is supposedly served by copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and 
the fair use doctrine.
41
  Copyright protection can be granted only to 
expression and not to ideas.
42
  Furthermore, the fair use doctrine protects 
First Amendment values because the purposes allowed under the fair use 
analysis “allow later authors to use a previous author’s copyright to 
introduce new ideas or concepts to the public.”43  The following cases 
demonstrate how these safeguards are inadequate with regard to the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works, particularly because current 
law makes a problematic distinction between parody and satire and ignores 
the intentions of copyright owners.
44
    
                                                                                                                          
34 Id.  
35 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001).   
36 Id. at 1261–62.   
37 Id. at 1262.   
38 Id.    
39 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”).   
40 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 3 (2008). 
41 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1263.   
42 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (concluding that copyright for a blank accounting 
book did not grant the owner the exclusive right over the accounting method).   
43 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1264.   
44 While this Note does not examine the exclusive right to reproduction, problems with the 
derivative works right may also arise from the reproduction right.   
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III.  TWO CASES 
Two recent cases involving literary works which were substantially 
similar to the novels of previous authors raise questions about the ways in 
which current law is succeeding or failing to achieve the goals of 
copyright.  In both cases, a subsequent author wrote what can arguably be 
deemed a sequel to an original author’s work.45  In one case, the court 
found that the work was a parody and therefore had a valid fair use 
defense.
46
  In a case nine years later, the court found that the “sequel” was 
a satire, and therefore did not constitute fair use.
47
  Ironically, both authors 
pulled characters, relationships, settings, famous scenes, and even dialogue 
from the original novel.
48
   
A.  Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 
In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit 
disagreed about whether Alice Randall’s novel, The Wind Done Gone, 
constituted fair use of Margaret Mitchell’s novel, Gone with the Wind.49  
Suntrust Bank brought suit as “the trustee of the Mitchell Trust, which 
holds the copyright in [Gone with the Wind].”50  The Trusts actively 
managed the copyright, and previously authorized derivative works of the 
novel, including a sequel.
51
   
Alice Randall’s novel The Wind Done Gone uses characters and scenes 
from Gone with the Wind.
52
  The work is told from the perspective of a 
slave named Cynara, the daughter of a Gone with the Wind character, 
Mammy, and the half-sister of the character Other, who represents 
Mitchell’s character of Scarlet in Gone with the Wind.53  In the book, 
Cynara has a relationship with the character representing Rhett Butler from 
Gone with the Wind.
54
  In the end, Cynara inherits the plantation where she 
                                                                                                                          
45 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing the various elements which 
Fredrik Colting used from J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267 
(explaining that Alice Randall used multiple features from Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind).   
46 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277. 
47 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83. 
48 Id. at 72; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267.    
49 Compare Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269–76 (concluding that “[The Wind Done Gone] is 
entitled to a fair-use defense” after analyzing the fair use factors), with Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1370–84 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (concluding that Suntrust Bank would 
likely succeed on its infringement claim).    
50 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259. 
51 Id.   
52 Note, Gone with the Wind Done Gone: “Re-Writing” and Fair Use, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 
1194 (2002). 
53 Id.   
54 Id.   
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grew up, “Tata,” which is similar to Gone with the Wind’s “Tara.”55  Other 
characters and places also appear in both novels.
56
   
Alice Randall admitted to appropriating elements from Gone with the 
Wind, but she claimed that the use was necessary for her critique of the 
depiction of slavery and the Civil War era American South in Mitchell’s 
novel.
57
  In her declaration to the court, Randall explained: 
In order to effectively debunk the harmful and offensive view 
of black people portrayed throughout Gone with the Wind, I 
thus had to create a work that would comment on the 
pervasiveness of that view in the book, in part by pointing 
out and dissecting for the reader the elements of that book—
characters, scenes and even carefull [sic] selected lines of 
dialogue—that help perpetuate that view.58  
Randall claimed to target Gone with the Wind for her parody because 
more than any other work she knew, it “presented and helped perpetuate an 
image of the South” that she “felt compelled to comment upon and 
criticize.”59  This compulsion for commentary and criticism could be 
similar to Fredrik Colting’s desire to comment on the quirks of Holden 
Caulfield and the way in which J.D. Salinger became a recluse.
60
  Under 
the current copyright system, however, Randall’s criticism was freely 
shared with the rest of the public while Colting’s was barred from 
distribution.
61
   
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
and the Eleventh Circuit disagreed about whether Mitchell’s estate should 
have been granted an injunction against the publication and distribution of 
the allegedly infringing book.
62
  This contrast in opinion boiled down to 
                                                                                                                          
55 Id. 
56 See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267 (“[The Wind Done Gone] appropriates numerous 
characters, settings, and plot twists from [Gone with the Wind].”).   
57 Id. at 1259.   
58 Declaration of Alice Randall at 6, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 
1357 (2001) (No. 1:01 CV-701-CAP).   
59 Id. at 1.  
60 See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Colting’s claim that his 
novel was not a sequel, but rather a critique of Salinger).   
61 See id. at 83 (concluding that on remand Salinger was likely to succeed on infringement claim 
and Colting was unlikely to succeed with fair use defense); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277 (finding an 
injunction to be an inappropriate remedy because The Wind Done Gone has a viable fair use defense).   
62 Compare Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276 (finding the district court erred by presuming 
irreparable injury simply because there was a likelihood of copyright infringement without properly 
considering the success of a fair-use defense), with Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. 
Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction which “enjoined [Houghton 
Mifflin Company] from further production, display, distribution, advertising, sale, or offer for sale of 
the book The Wind Done Gone”).    
 2013] THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT 1093 
the courts’ differing assessments of the fair use analysis.63  The fair use 
analysis considers the purpose and the character of the work, the nature of 
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion of the 
work used, and finally, the effect on the market value of the original.
64 
1.  Purpose and Character of the Work 
The biggest discrepancy between the district court and the appellate 
court was in their treatment of the first factor.
65
  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that in examining the purpose and 
character of the use, the critical question is whether the secondary work is 
transformative.
66
  A finding that the secondary work is transformative is 
not dispositive of fair use, but the more transformative the work, the less 
other factors, such as a commercial purpose, will weigh against a finding 
of fair use.
67 
The district court found that the first factor weighed in favor of the 
plaintiff because of the commercial purpose of The Wind Done Gone.
68
  
The district court also found, however, that the work was somewhat 
transformative and would therefore not give the first factor undue weight.
69
  
The district court concluded that while Randall’s book criticized Gone with 
the Wind in part, the overall purpose of the work was “to create a sequel to 
the older work and provide Ms. Randall’s social commentary to the 
antebellum South.  The work retells the earlier story in a condensed 
version from a different perspective but, in truth, merely encapsulates the 
same story while adding new twists.”70  The district court found that The 
Wind Done Gone contained transformative parodic elements that generally 
criticized the earlier work and the antebellum South, but the transformation 
was no more than that resulting from a sequel to an original work.
71
  The 
district court emphasized the Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell that a 
parody must comment on an author’s work,72 and found that Randall did 
not simply seek to criticize the treatment of African Americans in Gone 
with the Wind, but to give a more general criticism of the treatment of 
African Americans in the South.
73
  
                                                                                                                          
63 See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276–77 (stating that a fair use defense was likely to prevail 
because of a lack of irreparable injury and because comment and criticism are generally protected). 
64 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
65 See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (finding the new work had to include much of the original 
to effectively be a parody, and was thus transformative); Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. at 1378 (holding 
the new work is primarily a sequel and its transformative nature has little effect on that characteristic).   
66 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
67 Id.  
68 Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.   
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1378.   
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 1372 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81).   
73 Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377–78. 
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To support its claim that the work was closer to a sequel than a parody, 
the district court looked to a dictionary definition of a sequel: “a literary 
work continuing the course of a narrative begun in a preceding one.”74  The 
district court went on to conclude that The Wind Done Gone satisfied this 
definition because it used the fifteen main characters from Gone with the 
Wind, gave explanation and further details about what happened in the first 
work, and then explained what happened to them later on.
75
  The district 
court was not satisfied with the argument that because the work was told 
through Cynara’s perspective, it was not a sequel.  The district court found 
that “[i]f the work is intended to supply the missing story of the earlier 
work and takes up where the former work left off, then it is a sequel,” and 
therefore an infringement of the copyright owner’s derivative work.76 
In contrast to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that The 
Wind Done Gone was a parody of Gone with the Wind, not a sequel, and 
therefore was highly transformative.
77
  The Eleventh Circuit determined 
that Randall’s work was a statement seeking “to rebut and destroy the 
perspective, judgments, and mythology of [Gone with the Wind].”78  The 
court of appeals also noted that Randall tells the story through a different 
viewpoint, that Randall’s language is vastly different from Mitchell’s 
prose, and that the events from the original work are transformed into a 
new tale.
79
  The Eleventh Circuit held that Randall used the tools of parody 
to “make war” against Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind.80 
2.  Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Both courts agreed that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted 
work, weighed in favor of the copyright holder because Gone with the 
Wind should be afforded greater protection as a work of fiction.
81
  The 
Eleventh Circuit gave the factor little weight, however, because it was a 
parody case, and “parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, 
expressive works.”82 
3.  Amount and Substantiality of the Portion of the Work Used  
Application of the third factor was another point of disagreement 
between the district court and the court of appeals.  The third factor 
                                                                                                                          
74 Id. at 1375 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
75 Id.    
76 Id. at 1377. 
77 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001).   
78 Id. at 1270. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 1271. 
81 Id.; Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.   
82 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
586 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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considers the amount and substantiality of the portion used in the 
secondary work in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
83
  The 
Supreme Court in Campbell explained that this factor requires courts to 
consider the reasonableness of the quantity and value of the material in 
light of the purpose of the copying.
84
   The Court recognized that parodies 
present an interesting situation because “the parody must be able to 
‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its 
critical wit recognizable.”85 
The district court found that the amount and substantiality of the work 
used weighed against a finding of fair use.
86
  The district court concluded 
that Randall used too much copyrighted material to criticize Mitchell’s 
portrait of Southern history in Gone with the Wind.
87
  By including “the 
original work’s plot, themes, characters, character traits, settings, scenes, 
descriptive phrases, and verbatim quotes,” Randall went beyond what was 
necessary to parody Mitchell’s work and crossed into the realm of piracy.88 
The Eleventh Circuit was not convinced that Randall appropriated too 
much copyrighted material, nor was the court convinced that Randall did 
not.  The court of appeals noted several instances in which Randall used 
elements of Gone with the Wind and transformed them in The Wind Done 
Gone for purposes of commentary.
89
  The Eleventh Circuit considered the 
argument that Randall took more than was necessary to parody Gone with 
the Wind.
90
  On appeal, the court explained that the use is not necessarily 
infringing if it does more than conjure up the work, but that fair use 
depends on other factors such as the overriding purpose of the use and the 
likelihood that the parody will be a market substitute for the original.
91
  
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that the record did not support a 
finding one way or the other about the reasonableness of the quantity and 
value of the materials used in relation to the purpose of the work.
92
     
4.  Effect of the Market Value on the Original  
The fourth and final factor resulted in another split between the district 
court and the Eleventh Circuit.  The fourth factor calls for an analysis of 
“the effect of the use upon on the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work,” including both harm to the market for the original and 
                                                                                                                          
83 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
84 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.   
85 Id. at 588.   
86 Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.   
87 Id. at 1380–81. 
88 Id. at 1381.   
89 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001).   
90 See id. at 1272 (considering the particular elements taken from the original for the parody).   
91 Id. at 1273.   
92 Id. at 1274.   
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for derivative works.
93
  The fact that the commentary might be successful 
in killing demand for the original or derivative works is not the type of 
harm the courts are concerned with.
94
 
The district court found that while the parodic intent of the work may 
have been substantial, it did not compare to the potential harm due to the 
extensive copying.
95
  Because the district court found that the work was 
more similar to a sequel than a parodic commentary, that court held that 
the fourth factor weighed against a finding of fair use.
96
  In contrast, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Mitchell’s estate did not establish that The 
Wind Done Gone would act as a market substitute for Gone with the Wind 
or significantly harm its derivative market.
97
   
Despite the promising verdict of the Eleventh Circuit, Houghton 
Mifflin Company agreed to a settlement with the estate of Margaret 
Mitchell in May of 2002.
98
  At the request of the Mitchell Trusts, a 
contribution was made to Morehouse College and the copies of The Wind 
Done Gone would continue to be labeled an unauthorized parody.
99
 
B.  Salinger v. Colting  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
and the Second Circuit both held that author Fredrik Colting would not 
likely prevail in a fair use defense against claims of copyright infringement 
for his use of material from J.D. Salinger’s novel, The Catcher in the 
Rye.
100
  The Catcher in the Rye (“Catcher”) tells the story of a sixteen-
year-old, Holden Caulfield, who wanders around New York City for 
several days after being expelled from school.  The story is told from 
Holden’s perspective and throughout the novel there is a tension between 
Holden’s cynical view of “a world full of phonies and crooks and his love 
of family.”101  Colting’s novel, 60 Years Later, Coming Through the Rye 
(“60 Years Later”), tells the story of seventy-six-year-old Mr. C “in a 
world that includes Mr. C’s ninety-year-old author, a ‘fictionalized 
Salinger.’”102  The two works share similarities including:  
                                                                                                                          
93 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) 
(2006)). 
94 Id. at 592–93 (considering the argument that Randall took more than was necessary to parody 
the original work).   
95 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2001).    
96 Id.    
97 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276.   
98 David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles ‘Gone With the Wind’ Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 
2002, at C6.    
99 Id.    
100 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
101 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 70–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
102 Id. at 71–72.   
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Mr. C is Holden Caulfield.  Mr. C narrates like Holden, 
references events that happened to Holden, and shares many 
of Holden’s notable eccentricities.  Also, Mr. C’s adventures 
parallel those of Holden.  Both characters leave an 
institution, wander around New York City for several days, 
reconnect with old friends, find happiness with Phoebe, and 
ultimately return to a different institution.  Finally, within 
these broader structural similarities, the novels contain 
similar scenes . . . .
103
 
A significant difference between the two novels is that 60 Years Later 
includes a fictionalized Salinger who is haunted by his literary creation.
104
  
Salinger wishes to bring Caulfield back to life so that he can kill him.
105
  In 
the end, Caulfield meets Salinger in his home and the author, unable to kill 
him, decides to set him free.
106
 
Salinger was adamantly against derivative works involving Holden 
Caulfield.  He specifically instructed his lawyers not to allow any 
adaptations of his works.
107
  Colting argued that 60 Years Later was not a 
sequel, but rather a commentary on the portrayal of Holden Caulfield in 
Catcher, and on the relationship between Salinger and his created 
character.  Colting suggested that as the author grew old he “remain[ed] 
imprisoned by the literary character he created.”108  Given the 
transformative nature of this commentary, and the role of the Salinger 
character, Colting argued that the use of material from Catcher constituted 
fair use.
109
  Both the district court and court of appeals disagreed with 
Colting.
110
     
1.  Purpose and Character of the Work 
The district court found that the first factor, the nature and purpose of 
the work, weighed against a finding of fair use.
111
  The district court found 
that there was an obvious commercial use because it was to be sold for 
profit.
112
  In addition, the district court concluded that the novel was not a 
parody, and while it did contain some transformative elements because of 
the use of the Salinger character to comment on the author, it was not 
                                                                                                                          
103 Id. at 72 (citation omitted).   
104 Id. at 71–72. 
105 Id. at 72.   
106 Id.    
107 Id. at 71.   
108 Id. at 72 (quoting Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 10, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-CV)).     
109 Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
110 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73–74; Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
111 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 263.   
112 Id.  
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enough to weigh in favor of fair use.
113
  Specifically, the district court 
rejected Colting’s classification of his work as a parody of Catcher and its 
author because the work contained no specific criticism of a character or 
theme in Catcher.
114
  Rather, the district court concluded that Colting 
reiterated the same themes and traits found in Holden Caulfield in 
Salinger’s original story, instead of exposing them or commenting on 
them.
115
  The district court found that “[i]t is hardly parodic to repeat that 
same exercise in contrast, just because society and the characters have 
aged.”116 
The district court further concluded that the use of Salinger as a 
character was novel, but that it was not a parody because it critiqued the 
reclusive nature of Salinger and his zealous protection of his intellectual 
property.
117
  Parody criticizes the work, however, and therefore a criticism 
of Salinger did not constitute parody.
118
 
2.   Nature of the Copyrighted Work, Amount and Substantiality of the 
Portion of the Work Used, and the Effect of the Market Value on 
the Original  
The district court also concluded that the second factor weighed 
against a finding of fair use because Catcher is a creative work of fiction, 
and therefore entitled to strong copyright protection.
119
  Furthermore, the 
court found that the third factor weighed against a finding of fair use 
because Colting took more than was necessary from Catcher for the 
purpose of criticizing Salinger.
120
  In addition to the similarities between 
Holden and Mr. C, the district court found that the use of “similar and 
sometimes nearly identical supporting characters, settings, tone, and plot 
devices” was “unnecessarily high” for the alleged purpose.121   
Finally, the district court concluded that the potential harm to the 
market of the original work also weighed against a finding of fair use 
because Colting’s book had the potential to harm the market for sequels 
and other derivative works.
122
  In light of the fact that Salinger was 
adamant that there should never be any derivative works to Catcher, it is 
ironic that the district court concerned itself with harm to a market for 
works that would be highly unlikely to come.   
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. at 262–63.  
114 Id. at 258.   
115 Id. at 258–60. 
116 Id. at 259. 
117 Id. at 261. 
118 Id.   
119 Id. at 263.   
120 Id. at 267.   
121 Id. at 264–66.   
122 Id. at 268.  
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Ultimately, the district court decided that Colting was not likely to 
succeed with a fair use defense and therefore granted the requested 
preliminary injunction against the “manufacturing, publishing, distributing, 
shipping, advertising, promoting, selling, or otherwise disseminating any 
copy of 60 Years or any portion thereof, in or to the United States.”123  The 
Second Circuit agreed that 60 Years Later was not likely to constitute fair 
use, supporting the district court’s conclusion that Colting’s assertion that 
the primary purpose of the novel was to critique Salinger was not 
credible.
124
  The court of appeals remanded for a reevaluation of the 
preliminary injunction consistent with its holding that the standards laid 
out by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. and 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council apply to copyright 
infringement.
125
 
Colting reached a settlement with Salinger’s literary estate in 
December 2010.
126
  The settlement prohibited Colting from publishing or 
distributing the work in the United States or Canada, but freed him to sell 
the book in other international territories.
127
  Colting also agreed to change 
the title from “Coming Through the Rye,” and make no dedication of the 
book to Salinger.
128
  Moreover, the settlement prohibited “Colting or any 
publisher of the book from referring to The Catcher in the Rye, Salinger, 
the book being ‘banned’ by Salinger, or from using the litigation to 
promote the book.”129  
C.  Comparing the Two Cases 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. and Salinger v. Colting are 
similar because both cases involve an action to enjoin a secondary author 
from publishing a derivative work to an original author’s novel.130  
Furthermore, both secondary authors, Randall and Colting, appropriated 
characters, settings, and even some dialogue from the original works.
131
  
Finally, both cases are analogous in that both Randall and Colting asserted 
the affirmative defense of fair use
132—the defense resulted in the court’s 
                                                                                                                          
123 Id. at 268–69.   
124 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).   
125 Id. at 84.   
126 Andrew Albanese, J.D. Salinger Estate, Swedish Author Settle Copyright Suit, PUBLISHERS 
WKLY. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-
news/article/45738-j-d-salinger-estate-swedish-author-settle-copyright-suit.html.   
127 Id. 
128 Id.   
129 Id.  
130 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71–72; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 
(11th Cir. 2001).  
131 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267.   
132 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72–73; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.   
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analysis of the four fair use factors, including whether the secondary works 
were transformative parodies.
133
   
The significant difference between the two cases is that the Eleventh 
Circuit found that The Wind Done Gone was a parody of Gone with the 
Wind,
134
 and the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that critique 
was not the purpose of 60 Years Later.
135
  The Eleventh Circuit found The 
Wind Done Gone very transformative because it was a parody of 
Mitchell’s novel.136  By fitting the novel into the parody niche, the 
Eleventh Circuit was able to weigh the first factor in favor of fair use.
137
  
By contrast, the district court concluded that The Wind Done Gone was not 
a parody of Mitchell’s novel, and found that it was not transformative 
enough to constitute fair use.
138
  Likewise, the Second Circuit upheld the 
finding of United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York that 60 Years Later was not sufficiently transformative because it did 
not parody Catcher.
139
  The courts agreed that the novel was transformative 
because Colting satirized Salinger’s life, but that this transformative 
element was not adequate to weigh in favor of fair use.
140
    
As evidenced by these cases, where the court concluded that the work 
was a parody, and not a satire or general criticism, more weight was given 
towards a finding of fair use.  By contrast, satires were not considered to be 
very transformative.   This difference in weight was a result of the 
distinction between parody and satire made by the Supreme Court in 
Campbell.
141
  As a result of this distinction, creativity is stifled and the 
public suffers the loss of new works with different perspectives.  This is 
problematic to the overall goal of copyright: serving the public good.  
In both Suntrust Bank and Salinger, a consideration of the future 
intentions of the copyright owner with regard to derivative works did not 
play a substantial role.  The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia reviewed the Mitchell Trusts’ past actions with regard 
to authorizing sequels,
142
 and mentioned the Trust’s authorization of 
                                                                                                                          
133 See supra Part III.A (discussing the Eleventh Circuit and district court’s fair use analysis in 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company); supra Part III.B (discussing the Second Circuit and 
district court’s fair use analysis in Salinger v. Colting). 
134 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271.   
135 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.   
136 See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (noting the social benefit provided by Randall’s 
commentary on an earlier work).   
137 Id.    
138 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
139 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73, 83; Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009).  
140 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73; Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 261. 
141 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (explaining that 
parodies must mimic the original, whereas satires can stand on their own).   
142 Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1363–64.    
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sequels in the analysis of the fourth fair use factor, but the district court did 
not consider its future plans.
143
  In Salinger, the courts disregarded 
Salinger’s intentions to not create or license any derivative works of 
Catcher.
144
  By ignoring the fact that the copyright owner would prevent 
the publication of new works, the Second Circuit ensured that the ultimate 
goal of copyright would not be achieved.  There should be a more formal 
consideration of copyright owners’ intentions with regard to the derivative 
works right in order for courts and the U.S. Copyright Office to better 
manage the publishing of derivative works for public discourse.  
IV.  PARODY V. SATIRE  
One of the inherent problems with the fair use analysis is the 
distinction courts draw between parody and satire.  Courts should eliminate 
the parody/satire dichotomy because both parodies and satires share a 
common purpose of comment or criticism, these purposes are important to 
the public, and a copyright owner may be just as unwilling to give 
permission for a parody as for a satire.  
A.  Common Purpose 
The fair use defense protects works with such purposes as criticism or 
commentary.
145
  In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that “parody, like 
other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.”146  While 
both parodies and satires aim to criticize or comment, courts are more 
willing to find parodies to be fair use.
147
  Courts rely on the distinction the 
Supreme Court made in Campbell.  For the purpose of copyright law, the 
Court defined parody as “the use of some elements of a prior author’s 
                                                                                                                          
143 See id. at 1382 (noting that the Trust has authorized derivative works in the past, but not 
mentioning any future plans for derivative works). 
144 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74 (citing Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268).    
145 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
146 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.   
147 See Juli Wilson Marshall & Nicholas J. Siciliano, The Satire/Parody Distinction in Copyright 
and Trademark Law—Can a Satire Ever Be a Fair Use?, ABA Section of Litig. Intell. Prop. 
Litig. Comm. 3, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/roundtables/
0506_outline.pdf (explaining that courts are “transfixed by the apparent dichotomy in Campbell 
between parody and satire”); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (“Parody needs to mimic an 
original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective 
victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the 
very act of borrowing.”); Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73 (“60 Years Later does not parody Catcher or the 
Holden character, and although it might parody Salinger, that is insufficient because according to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, parody must critique or comment on the work itself.” (citations 
omitted)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing 
that parody justifiably borrows from the original work and satire does not); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that The Cat NOT in the Hat! 
is not transformative because the work does not hold the Dr. Seuss characteristic style up to ridicule).   
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composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that 
author’s works.”148  In contrast, the Court stated that other forms of 
commentary borrowing from original works, including satire, which have 
“no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, 
which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the 
drudgery in working up something fresh” have less claim to fair use.149  
Parodists have better claim to the fair use defense because they are 
commenting on the original work, whereas satirists are commenting on 
something broader.  While the Court in Campbell weighed all of the 
factors in analyzing fair use, other courts rely heavily on the dichotomy the 
Court created between parody and satire.  The trend in courts is that   
if the new work arguably criticized or commented on the 
original, a parodic character reasonably can be perceived . . . 
the other factors concurrently become less important, and a 
fair use finding is quick to follow.  On the other hand, if the 
new work used the original work as a mere vehicle to 
criticize something else (such as society in general), it is 
satire, not parody, and therefore not fair use.
150
 
In spite of this distinction, both parodies and satires share a common 
purpose—commentary—that is protected under the fair use defense.151  
Alice Randall attempted to criticize Margaret Mitchell’s depiction of 
slavery and the South, and Fredrik Colting attempted to criticize J.D. 
Salinger and his desperate protection of the Holden Caulfield character.  In 
both instances, the courts relied on the Supreme Court’s distinction 
between parody and satire.  The Eleventh Circuit found that Randall 
criticized Gone with the Wind, and The Wind Done Gone was therefore a 
parody because it critiqued a preexisting work.
152
  In contrast, Colting used 
the work to critique Salinger, and not Catcher.  Colting clearly criticized 
Salinger and made a comment on Catcher.
153
  Because the fair use analysis 
calls for a balancing test, it cannot be said that the courts found the fact that 
Colting wrote a satiric sequel and not a parody dispositive of copyright 
infringement.
154
  But the Eleventh Circuit was certainly generous with The 
Wind Done Gone as it, as well as Suntrust Bank, fit it into the parody 
                                                                                                                          
148 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.   
149 Id. 
150 Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 3.   
151 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
152 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271.  
153 Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
154 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 n.14 (explaining that in light of the other fair use factors 
and the extent of transformation, a parody may not constitute fair use and satire may be fair use).   
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niche.
155
   
A significant result of the parody/satire dichotomy is the post-hoc 
realization by attorneys and judges to classify derivative works as parodies 
in order to find fair use.  Courts’ preference for parody over satire 
corresponds with “a tendency for both lawyers and judges to couch any 
work it deems a fair use as a parody.” 156  This is particularly problematic 
because many works tend to resist classification.  Like The Wind Done 
Gone and 60 Years Later, many works combine satiric and parodic 
elements to comment generally on or to criticize an original work and 
something broader.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit found that The 
Wind Done Gone was specifically a criticism of Mitchell’s depiction of 
slavery in Gone with the Wind.
157
  In contrast, the district court found that 
the work was not merely a criticism of the treatment of African-Americans 
in Gone with the Wind, “but also [a] comment upon the treatment of black 
Americans in the South in the 1930’s, 1940’s and 1950’s as well as 
today.”158  Relying on Campbell, the district court concluded that the work 
would not gain fair use protection as a parody if it simply used the work to 
ridicule a broader subject.
159
  The district court would not find The Wind 
Done Gone a parody because “the parodical work must parody the work 
itself and not other general concepts and ideas about the way black 
Americans have been and are treated in the South.”160  In light of the 
difficulty of classifying works as a parody or a satire, it is illogical to 
create a bright line between the two.  The parody/satire dichotomy 
encourages lawyers and judges to create a bright line where none exists.   
B.  Both Forms of Critique Are Important to the Public  
The Supreme Court has emphasized that this country strives for “the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources.”161  Criticism and commentary—of artistic and non-artistic works 
alike—are important to the dissemination of information and the resulting 
discussion.  In its opinion in Suntrust Bank, the Eleventh Circuit identified 
“one of the most important purposes to consider [as] the free flow of 
ideas—particularly criticism and commentary.”162  The fair use statute 
                                                                                                                          
155 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 2001) 
(explaining that the former cover of The Wind Done Gone did not describe the work as a parody, and 
the new cover was changed to explicitly advertise the work as a parody before the plaintiff’s motion for 
a temporary restraining order).   
156 Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 6.  
157 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270.   
158 Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.   
159 Id. at 1377–78.  
160 Id. at 1378.   
161 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997) (citations omitted).   
162 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268.     
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makes no distinction between commentary and criticism of copyrighted 
works or other subject matter.
163
  This proves that commentary and 
criticism are generally worthy of protection, not just commentary or 
criticism of copyrighted works.  
C.  Licenses for a Derivative Work  
The underlying theory of protecting parodies under fair use is that a 
copyright owner would license an author to use his or her work for satire, 
but not for parody.
164
  It rests on the notion that a copyright owner would 
be willing to license his work as a vehicle for broader social commentary 
(satire), but not to criticize his or her own work (parody).
165
  This theory is 
logical, but inaccurate.  For example, J.D. Salinger would not allow 
Colting the use of Catcher to create a satire.
166
  Furthermore, several artists 
gave licenses to Weird Al Yankovic to parody their music.
167
  Dimension 
Films also gave a license to the parody, Scary Movie, based on Dimension 
Films’ own movie Scream.168 
A broader, but more accurate theory would not distinguish between 
parody and satire.  Rather, it should be said that a secondary author who 
wants to create a derivative work that will reflect negatively on the original 
work will be unlikely to secure a license from the copyright owner.
169
  In 
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, the authors of The Cat NOT in the 
Hat!, a book satirizing the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial, did not seek 
permission from Seuss Enterprises to use its copyrighted books.
170
  In the 
resulting lawsuit, 
Dr. Seuss’s motivation in seeking to enjoin Penguin’s book 
was to avoid having the reputation of its works damaged by 
the sordid events of the Simpson murders.  Given the 
negative reflection this kind of use creates, the original 
author is unlikely to voluntarily grant a license at any 
                                                                                                                          
163 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).   
164 Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 5.  
165 Id.  
166 See supra Part III.B (discussing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also 
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that “Salinger has not 
demonstrated any interest in publishing a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher”).   
167 Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 5.   
168 Id.  
169 See Jason M. Vogel, Note, The Cat in the Hat’s Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit’s 
Narrowing of the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 310–11 (1998) (“[I]n an ordinarily functioning market a 
subsequent author wishing to create a socially-valuable (and thus economically-viable) derivative work 
will be able to secure a license from the original author, who presumably will be inclined to permit any 
wealth-producing use.  However, in certain circumstances, where the subsequent use reflects negatively 
on the original author, she will be disinclined to license the use at any price.” (footnote omitted)).   
170 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997).    
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price.
171
   
In Salinger, the copyright owner was unwilling to grant a license for 
any derivative work,
172
 but it was even more unlikely to license a work that 
reflected negatively on Salinger himself.  In Suntrust Bank, the Mitchell 
Trusts authorized sequels to Gone with the Wind, but sought to enjoin 
Randall from publishing the negatively skewed The Wind Done Gone.
173
  
The ultimate settlement suggests that for a certain price the Mitchell Trusts 
might have licensed the alleged parody, but there is no guarantee that 
either party would have agreed without a lawsuit.     
The Eleventh Circuit noted that “copyright laws were enacted in part to 
prevent private censorship.”174   The derivative work right gives authors the 
right to an indirect censorship power because copyright owners have 
excessive control over subsequent works that may reflect negatively on the 
original work.  The concurring judge in the Eleventh Circuit opinion in 
Suntrust Bank rejected granting authors the power of indirect censorship.
175
  
The judge expressed particular concern over empowering copyright owners 
to block the publication of critical derivative works.
176
  The Eleventh 
Circuit successfully prevented the Mitchell Trusts from prohibiting a 
critical examination of Gone with the Wind, but J.D. Salinger was able to 
stop Colting from publishing a work that was critical of him.  
Distinguishing between parodies and satires gives authors greater indirect 
censorship power because courts are more likely to find parodies to be fair 
use than satires.  Therefore, satiric works which may reflect negatively on 
the original work, but are important to the public discourse, are prevented 
from publication.     
D.   Overcoming the Challenge to Removing the Distinction Between 
Parody and Satire 
A major challenge to the idea of removing the distinction between 
parody and satire is the Court’s justification in Campbell that “[p]arody 
needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use 
the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas 
                                                                                                                          
171 Vogel, supra note 169, at 313 (footnote omitted).    
172 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71 (2d. Cir. 2010).   
173 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363–64 (N.D. Ga. 2001).   
174 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001).   
175 Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (“The law grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly 
in their expressive works.  It should not also . . . grant them a power of indirect censorship.”).   
176 See id. (“Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics.  Destructive parodies play an important 
role in social and literary criticism and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or 
discredit an original author.”); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3 
(2d Cir. 1998) (“Because the social good is served by increasing the supply of criticism—and thus, 
potentially, of truth—creators of original works cannot be given the power to block the dissemination 
of critical derivative works.”).   
 1106 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1083 
satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the 
very act of borrowing.”177  The Court’s claim rests on the notion that 
parody comments on the author’s work and satire comments on something 
outside of the work.
178
  Parodists must use the original work, whereas 
satirists can use various original works, or none at all.  While this idea is 
logical, it is counterproductive to the promotion of the arts because it 
stifles creativity.  Colting chose to satirize the life of J.D. Salinger.
179
  It is 
possible that Colting could have written a satire about Salinger without 
reference to any original work, but Salinger is known for his writing, 
particularly Catcher.  Without the use of Catcher and the character of 
Holden Caulfield, the effect of Colting’s satire may be lost.  Theoretically 
a “satire can stand on its own two feet,”180 but authors may find it more 
effective to use a previous work that will conjure up themes, ideas, and 
images for the audience.  The Court stated that a satire required a 
“justification for the very act of borrowing.”181  Promoting creativity for 
the good of the public is a valid justification that should not be ignored.   
V.  PROPOSAL FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INTENTIONS OF 
COPYRIGHT OWNERS FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS  
A.  Reasons to Consider the Intentions of Copyright Owners  
Another solution to promote the publication of new works is for the 
U.S. Copyright Office and the courts to consider the copyright owner’s 
intentions with regard to the derivative work right.  Suntrust Bank and 
Salinger provide two examples of the right to prepare derivative works 
creating obstacles to the public’s access to new works.  Granting copyright 
owners the exclusive right to prepare derivative works does not guarantee 
that copyright owners will use the right.  For example, the Mitchell Trusts 
attempted to prevent Randall’s derivative work, and likewise, Salinger and 
later his estate effectively prevented Colting from publishing in the United 
States.  Moreover, Salinger himself was adamant that he would not create 
any derivative works to Catcher or the character of Holden Caulfield.
182
   
When copyright owners do not intend to use the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works, either through their own creation or licensing 
others to do so, it can be problematic to the goals of copyright.  It acts to 
recognize moral rights of literary authors and grants them an indirect 
censorship power.  Authors like Fredrik Colting are being denied a basic 
                                                                                                                          
177 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).   
178 Id. at 580.   
179 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010). 
180 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.  
181 Id.   
182 Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71. 
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First Amendment right to free speech.   
An example from the United Kingdom is illustrative.  The United 
Kingdom granted a perpetual copyright for J.M. Barrie’s play, Peter Pan, 
to the long-term copyright holder, Great Ormond Street Hospital.
183
  
According to author Emily Somma, the work has already entered the 
public domain in the United States.
184
  The play has been used to create 
several new works, including the recent movies Hook and Finding 
Neverland, as well as a new book written by Somma, After the Rain.
185
  
The creation of these works “illustrate the ability of authors and artists to 
build upon previous works.”186  Even still, the Great Ormond Street 
Hospital legally opposed the publishing of Somma’s book.187  When a 
copyright holder is “able to control such copyrights in perpetuity, the 
creation of many new works, of benefit to society for purposes ranging 
from entertainment to education to self-enlightenment, [has] to be 
aborted.”188  When the copyright owner opposes new derivative works 
through a lawsuit or refusal to license the derivative work, the United 
States public is denied creative new works that give a fresh perspective to 
beloved past works.  Likewise, authors are being denied free expression.  
Suntrust Bank and Salinger present similar situations because two authors 
wrote with a new perspective on stories and characters that have been 
integral to American literature.  Because of the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works, society is denied the creativity of secondary authors and 
individuals are denied the right to freely express themselves.   
By taking into account the copyright owner’s intentions, the system 
can reduce the frequency of copyright owners stifling creativity of 
secondary authors through the refusal to create or license derivative works.   
B.    Practical Approaches to Considering the Intentions of Copyright 
Owners  
1.  Renewal of Derivative Rights Work    
A practical way to take into account the intentions of the copyright 
owner is to require owners to renew the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works.  Rather than the right to prepare derivative works lasting 
for the life of the author plus seventy years, it should last for a short length 
                                                                                                                          
183 Jennifer S. Green, Comment, Copyrights in Perpetuity: Peter Pan May Never Grow Up, 24 
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 841, 844 (2006).   
184 Id.  
185 Id. at 842, 852.  
186 Id.  
187 See id. at 842 (stating that Somma’s “contemporary novel . . . inspired both litigation and 
discussion focusing on copyright issues”).   
188 Id. at 852.  
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of time.
189
  For example, each copyright owner will be granted the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works for ten years.  After ten years, 
the copyright owner can renew the right by submitting to the U.S. 
Copyright Office evidence of the intention to create or license a derivative 
work.  Trademark law requires owners of the mark to submit an affidavit 
that the mark is still being used in commerce, otherwise the mark is 
considered abandoned and goes into the public domain.
190
  By requiring 
copyright owners to submit evidence of plans for a derivative work right, 
the U.S. Copyright Office can encourage potential new works.  The fair 
use limitation would continue to protect secondary authors who wish to 
create derivative works that are critical of original works and who have 
difficulty receiving a license.   
2.    Adding a Fair Use Analysis Factor that Considers the Intentions 
of the Copyright Owner  
Another possibility is to add a fifth factor into the fair use analysis in 
cases involving derivative works.  The factor would consider the intentions 
of the copyright owner.  In Salinger, the courts should have given more 
weight to a finding of fair use because J.D. Salinger had no intention of 
preparing or licensing any derivative works.  By considering the intention 
of the author, the court is able to consider what will most benefit the 
public.  The public will receive greater benefit from a new work by a 
secondary author than from protecting the moral rights of J.D. Salinger.   
In Salinger the courts indirectly recognized the moral rights of J.D. 
Salinger.  Although the court recognized that Salinger had publicly 
disclaimed any intention of authorizing a sequel, the court noted that 
Salinger had the right to change his mind and, even if he had no intention 
of changing his mind, there is value in the right not to authorize derivative 
works.
191
  The choice not to create derivative works, and not to license 
anyone else to create derivative works, serves to protect the integrity of 
Catcher.  By preventing any derivative works, including those written by 
him, “Salinger seemingly wanted to classify Catcher and Caulfield as off-
                                                                                                                          
189 Another alternative to shortening the period of protection of the derivative works right is to 
shorten the length of all copyright protection.  The period of protection for copyrighted works should 
be shortened.  When there are problems in the system it is always better for those problems to last for a 
shorter period of time.  The length of protection is currently life of the author plus seventy years, 
virtually granting copyright owners perpetual protection.  As a result, the free expression of new 
authors and the public is limited.  See generally Green, supra note 183; Matthew A. Kaplan, Note, 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, but Are They Copyrightable?: Protection of Literary 
Characters with Respect to Secondary Works, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 817, 838–39 (1999) (proposing that the 
length of protection should be limited to the life of the author).   
190 15 U.S.C § 1058 (2006); see also Kaplan, supra note 189, at 839 (suggesting that copyright 
owners submit proof that they plan on using their works in the future).   
191 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 
250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).   
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limits . . . as if any later use would compromise the integrity of the work 
and the character and would alter the vision he had for them at the time of 
creation.”192  Salinger’s focus on the integrity of Catcher suggested a 
moral-rights objective in his action against Colting.  U.S. copyright law 
does not traditionally protect moral rights, but rather emphasizes economic 
rights.
193
  Where federal copyright law does recognize moral rights, it 
applies to works of visual art, under the protection of the Visual Artists 
Rights Act.
194
  Moral rights are not given to authors of literary works, like 
Salinger.
195
  If courts consider the intentions of copyright owners they can 
more effectively make decisions that will lead to the publication of 
derivative works.   
An alternative to having a fifth factor is to include a consideration of 
the copyright owner’s intentions in the fourth factor: the effect on the 
market value of the original.  In both Suntrust Bank and Salinger the courts 
considered the impact on the potential derivatives market.
196
  If the 
copyright owner has no intention of creating derivative works or licensing 
others to create them, this factor should weigh in favor of a finding of fair 
use.    
C.   Obstacles to the Effective Consideration of the Intentions of Copyright 
Owners  
Considering the author’s intentions through a required renewal of the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works or adding a fifth factor to a fair 
use analysis in derivative works cases faces two significant obstacles.  The 
first is that it diminishes the importance of author’s rights.  The second is 
that it is impractical to know the true intentions of a copyright owner.  
1.  Diminishing Authors’ Rights 
The Second Circuit recognized that Salinger had no intention of 
preparing or licensing derivative works.  The court decided that Salinger 
had a right to change his mind and that there is value to an exclusive right 
                                                                                                                          
192 Arlen W. Langvardt & Tara E. Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing First 
Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the Traditional View, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 99, 
138 (2011).   
193 Id. at 138.  
194 Id. at 139.    
195 Id. at 133 (“[M]oral rights are not available to authors of works of the sort at issue in 
Salinger.”).  
196 See Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (“The inquiry ‘must take account not only of harm to the 
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.’” (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994))); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (“The final fair-use factor requires us to consider the effect that the publication of [The Wind 
Done Gone] will have on the market for or value of Suntrust’s copyright in [Gone with the Wind], 
including the potential harm it may cause to the market for derivative works based on GWTW.”).  
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to prepare derivative works, but there is also value in the choice to not 
authorize these works.
197
  By requiring copyright owners to renew the right 
to prepare derivative works by offering evidence of an intention to do so, 
the copyright owner’s option of changing his or her mind is effectively 
eliminated.  Furthermore, it eliminates the author’s choice to not authorize 
any derivative work and isolate the original work as one of a kind.  This 
may be counterproductive to the promotion of new works because 
some artists may be further incentivized to create original 
works due to the availability of the right not to produce any 
sequels.  This might be the case if, for instance, an author’s 
artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of 
his character’s story to the varied imaginations of his readers, 
or if he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and 
speculation as to what happened subsequently.  Just as 
licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to 
the creation of originals, so too will the right not to license 
derivatives sometimes act as an incentive to the creation of 
originals.
198
  
 
By eliminating the option to not license derivative works and maintain the 
exclusive right, fewer original authors may be compelled to write.   
This is a necessary risk, however.  Furthermore, this proposal 
maintains the other exclusive rights which act to incentivize new works.  In 
light of the other incentives artists will continue to create.  By considering 
the intentions of copyright owners, copyright law can also encourage 
artists to be inspired by past works.    
The copyright system calls for a balance between creating incentives 
for authors, and giving the public access to new works.  The Supreme 
Court concluded, however, that the ultimate goal of copyright law is “to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”199  As it is, 
copyright law gives greater deference to creating incentives for copyright 
owners than the need to stimulate artistic output.  By considering the 
intentions of copyright owners with regard to the opportunity to prepare 
derivative works, the copyright system can prevent copyright owners from 
stifling future works.  If a copyright owner does not see fit to create 
derivative works, then a copyright owner should not have the exclusive 
right to do so.  The ultimate goal of copyright law is to serve the public.  
                                                                                                                          
197 Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268).  
The court explained that while the licensing of derivative works is an economic incentive to produce 
originals, the right not to license such works may also be an incentive to the production of originals.  
Id. 
198 Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268.   
199 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).   
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The public is best served by increased access to new works and fresh 
perspectives.  
2.  Determining the Intentions of Copyright Owners  
It may be impractical to determine the true intentions of a copyright 
owner because the inquiry is subjective.  It would be administratively 
difficult for the U.S. Copyright Office to follow up on the activity of every 
copyright owner.  Copyright owners may feel compelled to submit false 
affidavits to renew the right, without any actual intention of following 
through.  Likewise, copyright owners may submit evidence of intentions 
for derivative works to courts that they actually have no intention of 
following through with.  A multi-factor test would need to be created 
which considers past activity and current steps towards a derivative work.  
Ultimately, it would take time to perfect the system, but the result would 
be beneficial to the public good.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In his infinite wisdom J.D. Salinger wrote:  
Among other things, you’ll find that you’re not the first 
person who was ever confused and frightened and even 
sickened by human behavior.  You’re by no means alone on 
that score, you’ll be excited and stimulated to know.  Many, 
many men have been just as troubled morally and spiritually 
as you are right now.  Happily, some of them kept records of 
their troubles.  You’ll learn from them—if you want to.  Just 
as someday, if you have something to offer, someone will 
learn something from you.  It’s a beautiful, reciprocal 
arrangement.  And it isn’t education.  It’s history.  It’s 
poetry.
200
 
Alice Randall and Fredrik Colting had something to offer to this 
“beautiful, reciprocal arrangement.”  Unfortunately, the laws of copyright 
stood in their way.  In the case of Colting’s 60 Years Later the public was 
denied the opportunity to learn something from Colting.  In the case of 
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, the public is fortunate that Houghton 
Mifflin was able to support the high transaction costs of litigation.   
The current copyright system is unable to achieve its ultimate goal of 
serving the public good with new artistic creation, which can contribute to 
the exchange of ideas.  United States copyright law grants too much power 
and control to authors, particularly in light of the expansive derivative 
works right.   
                                                                                                                          
200 J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 189 (1991).   
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Both parodies and satires serve important purposes and should be seen 
as very transformative in the fair use analysis.  By removing the distinction 
between the two, the public will have increased access to works of 
criticism and commentary.   
It is also necessary to consider whether copyright owners intend to 
prepare derivative works.  It is counterproductive to the goal of creating 
new works to grant copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works when the owners have no intention of doing so.  Creating 
incentives for original authors to create work is vitally necessary for the 
promotion of the arts.  If copyright law continues to allow authors to 
prevent other future works, however, without providing his or her own 
work, then progress is stifled and the copyright system fails.  It is time for 
the United States copyright system to realign with its goals and encourage 
authors to contribute to the beautiful reciprocal arrangement that benefits 
the public good. 
 
